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URING the 1960s, organizations began offering very small loans
to the world's poorest people. Because the loans were so small,
such services were dubbed microfinance. Over the years,
microfinance services expanded to include savings, insurance, and remit-
tance services. Additionally, many of the early participants in the indus-
try were social and religious nonprofit organizations motivated as much
by faith and charity as by economics. In recent years, as the microfinance
industry has matured, commercial banks and equity investors have awak-
ened to the potential of an untapped market of 3 billion customers.
Many banks enter the industry by providing capital to nonprofit
microfinance organizations, while other entities directly provide an array
of financial services to the world's poorest populations. Financial institu-
tions have realized that investing in the poor is a profitable proposition.
But following September 11, 2001, most of the players in the
microfinance industry must confront the challenge of complying with new
anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/
CFT) regulations.
By encouraging microfinance expansion and implementing AML/CFF
regulations, nations committed to stopping terrorism will protect the
peace while profiting the poor. This paper examines the issues arising
from the intersection of an evolving microfinance industry with new fi-
nancial regulatory regimes containing AML/CFT regulations. The re-
mainder of Part I briefly outlines the problem of terrorist financing, the
microfinance industry, and the intersection of both. Part II provides an
overview of the microfinance industry in Latin America including: legal
forms of entities, services offered, financing methods, and relevant regu-
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lation in Bolivia, Mexico, and Colombia. Part III summarizes interna-
tional legal developments regarding the financial services regulation
designed to prevent the financing of terrorism. Part IV evaluates pro-
posed alternatives for balancing the needs of the poor against the need to
curtail terrorist financing.
A. THE PROBLEM: TERRORIST FINANCING AND MONEY LAUNDERING
Money laundering and terrorist financing pose a serious threat to the
soundness of the international financial system. Combating these threats
requires a coordinated and cooperative response from the international
community at large.1
Money laundering disguises "the illegal origin of criminal proceeds
without disclosing their source," while terrorist financing "uses legitimate
or illegitimate funds to facilitate an act of terror."' 2 After the September
11, 2001, attacks, the international community mobilized to combat ter-
rorism. Article 2 of the United Nations International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism defines terrorism as:
[a]ny . . .act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostil-
ities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by
its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act. 3
As part of the strategy to defeat terrorists, the international community
focused on pursuing various strategies to combat terrorist financing. Yet
using money for illegal and illicit purposes is not a novel concept. In fact,
about US $1 trillion are laundered annually.4 Estimates suggest that
money laundering could amount to as much as 2 to 5 percent of world
gross domestic product.5 Unfortunately, knowing how much laundered
money finances terrorism cannot be accurately calculated. While putting
a dent in a trillion dollar problem may seem like an easy undertaking, the
most significant and tragic terrorist attacks have cost a mere fraction of
these enormous amounts. For example, the FBI estimated the September
1. Kader Asmal, President, Fin. Action Task Force on Money Laundering, An Ad-
dress for the Plenary VIII Meeting of the Asia Pacific Group (July 11, 2005), http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/13/55/35264257.pdf.
2. JENNIFER ISERN ET AL., Focus NOTE No. 29: AML/CFr REGULATION: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS THAT SERVE LOW-INCOME PEOPLE 3
(2005), available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/27418 file Focus
Note_29.pdf [hereinafter AML/CFr IMPLICATIONS].
3. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 2,
para. 1(b), 39 U.N. Doc. A[RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://un-
treaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv12.pdf.
4. World Bank Group, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Ter-
rorism, http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/index.htm (last visited Feb.
6, 2006).
5. International Monetary Fund, Fighting Dirty Money, 33 IMF SURVEY 242 (2004),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2004/080904.pdf [hereinaf-
ter IMF SURVEY].
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11th attacks cost between $300,000 and $500,000,6 and the terrorist attack
in 2000 on the U.S.S. Cole cost only $50,000.7 Looking for miniscule
amounts like these in a US $1 trillion money laundering industry is like
looking for a needle in a haystack.
Since September 11, 2001, increased regulation has worked to help pre-
vent terrorists from exploiting the global financial system. As one U.S.
government official declared, "[t]errorists can no longer safely use the
international banking system." As a result, terrorists are turning to al-
ternative methods to launder funds including cash couriers, charitable or-
ganizations, and informal value transfer systems. 9 While these alternative
methods supply an important need in the developing world, the
microfinance industry provides similar services that are not as vulnerable
to terrorist exploitation.
B. THE INDUSTRY: MICROFINANCE
Historically, microfinance has been synonymous with microcredit-the
provision of very small, short term loans to poor entrepreneurs in devel-
oping countries.' 0 Microcredit is in high demand in developing countries
where local moneylenders charge as much as 10 to 20 percent interest per
day-the equivalent of an annual percentage rate of 4000 percent!11 Al-
though microcredit typically carries higher interest rates than banking in-
dustry norms, higher rates are necessary to cover the increased costs12 of
serving the microfinance market segment. And these higher interest
rates still compare very favorably to the exorbitant rates charged by mon-
eylenders. In recent years, microfinance services have expanded to in-
clude the offering of credit, savings, remittance, and insurance services to
the world's poorest clientele. 13 Microfinance institutions (MFIs) special-
6. Matthew A. Levitt, The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism, 6 MIDDLE
EAST REV. OF INT'L AFF. 49 (2002), available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/
issue4/levitt.pdf.
7. Al-Qaeda Operations Are Rather Cheap, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2003.
8. Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use
of the Internet, 5 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 5, 3 (2003/2004), http:/I
www.stlr.org/ html/volume5/hinnen.pdf (quoting Honorable Alan Larson, Under
Sec'y of State for Econ., Bus., and Agric. Affairs).
9. See generally Financial Action Task Force [FATFI, Methods and Trends, http://
www.fatf-gafi.orgldocument/23/0,2340,en_32250379-32237277_34037591 1 1_1 1,
00.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
10. AML/CFT IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 11.
11. CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR, MICROFINANCE IN CENTRAL
AMERICA AND MEXICO: PROFILE AND CHALLENGES 3 (2001), available at http://
www.cgap.org/docs/CaseStudy-centralamerica.pdf [hereinafter CGAP CASE
STUDY].
12. Increased costs result from managing thousands of small loans with a high turno-
ver rate and conducting extensive client visits sometimes in remote locations. TOR
JANSSON ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR REGULATING AND SUPERVISING
MICROFINANCE 23 (2004), available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/ files/
21298_30.pdf [hereinafter PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES].
13. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, MICROFINANCE: A VIEW FROM THE FUND 4
(2005), available at http://www.imf.org/External/np/pp/eng/2005/012505.pdf [here-
inafter IMF MICROFINANCE].
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ize in providing these financial services, and throughout this paper the
term refers generally to entities that participate in the microfinance
industry.
Demand for microfinance services is huge. About 3 billion people sub-
sist on only $2 per day, while 1 billion of these live on only $1 or less per
day. 14 The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) esti-
mates the total microfinance market to be between 400 and 500 million
households-with only around 30 million, or less than 10 percent, re-
ported to have access to microfinance services in 2002.15 Studies indicate
that the fruits of microfinance include increased "income stability and
growth, school attendance, nutrition, and health" and the empowerment
of women.1 6 Yet in 2001, the World Bank (Bank) estimated that the
10,000 existing MFIs only reached 4 percent of the potential market. 17
Perhaps this is due in part to the fact that microfinance clients typically
lack basic financial information and "have difficulty obtaining legal docu-
ments verifying their business activity, land tenure, value of assets and
even identity." 18
Modem microfinance began during the late 1960s, but only in the past
two decades has the industry matured and demonstrated that
microfinance is a sustainable, even profitable, operational model. In Oc-
tober 2005, United Nations' Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated,
"[m]icrofinance is not charity. In some cases, it might have started out as
philanthropy. But today it is a real business."'19 Policymakers and busi-
ness people have realized that investing in the poor is a profitable pro-
position. As the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports:
To achieve its full potential, microfinance must become a fully inte-
grated part of a developing country's mainstream financial system
14. World Bank, About Us: Millennium Development Goals, http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/O,,contentMDK:20104132-menuPK:
250991-pagePK:43912-piPK:44037-theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2006).
15. United Nations Capital Development Fund, Basic Facts About Microfinance, http:/
/www.uncdf.org/english/microfinance/facts.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter Basic Facts].
16. Elizabeth Littlefield & Richard Rosenberg, Microfinance and the Poor, FIN. &
DEV., June 2004, at 38, 39, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/
2004/ 06/pdf/littlefi.pdf.
17. Basic Facts, supra note 15.
18. JACQUES TRIGO LOUBILRE ET AL., SUPERVISING & REGULATING MICROFINANCE
IN THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL SECTOR LIBERALIZATION: LESSONS FROM Bo-
LIVIA, COLOMBIA AND MEXICO 38 (2004), available at http://www.microfinance
gateway.org/files/21469-M13e.pdf [hereinafter SUPERVISING & REGULATING
MICROFINANCE].
19. Ximena Escobar de Nogales, Geneva Symposium Addresses Investing Private Cap-
ital in Microfinance: Attracts Broad Private Sector Participation, MICROFINANCE
MATTERS, Oct. 2005, at 33, available at http://uncdf.org/english/microfinance/news
letter/pages/2005_10/MicrofinanceMattersIssue_17.pdf. United Nations Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan spoke these words as he opened the two-day Geneva
Private Capital Symposium that was held from October 10-11, 2005, and focused
on the business case for private capital in microfinance from the perspective of
financial and banking experts. Id.
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rather than being confined to a niche of the development
community.
... There is growing awareness that building financial systems for the
poor means building sound domestic financial intermediaries that
can mobilize and recycle domestic savings. Foreign donor and social
investor capital diminishes as individual institutions and entire mar-
kets mature. 20
In the early years of microfinance, foreign donor funds were critical to
establishing the industry. Substantial support came from the United Na-
tions Development Program (UNDP) and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), as well as regional development
banks including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 21 The
United States, one of the leading supporters of microfinance, "has com-
mitted more than $2 billion ... in the past 15 years, averaging $155 mil-
lion annually across almost 50 countries. '22 While these foreign donor
funds were important to the industry's incubation, "depositors, creditors
and investors ... are the ones that in the long run will provide the funds
to sustain the growth of the microfinance industry. '23
C. THE INTERSECTION: MICROFINANCE AND TERRORIST FINANCING
So terrorist financing is a prevalent problem, and microfinance is a rap-
idly growing industry. But what is the point? Both of these movements
are now intersecting at a perplexing crossroads. After September 11,
2001, AML/CFF regulatory regimes became more stringent and perva-
sive.24 At the same time, microfinance industry growth has been acceler-
ating and expanding to obtain a formidable share of the international
financial services market. Now, governments, regulators, MFIs, bankers,
development specialists, and multitudes of potential microfinance cus-
tomers are wondering how to reconcile the goals and objectives of the
microfinance industry with the implementation of international AML/
CFT regulations. 25
Two primary concerns are remittances and the participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in the microfinance industry. Re-
mittance services remain vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists, and
NGOs are considered to be potential conduits of terror funds.26 These
20. Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 39.
21. IMF MICROFINANCE, supra note 13, at 18.
22. Isobel Coleman, Defending Microfinance, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 181, 182
(2005).
23. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 16.
24. Posting of David Porteous to Affordable Housing Institute Blog: The Bankable
Frontier, http://www.affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/bankable/2005/09/
moneyjlaunderin.html (Sept. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Porteous].
25. As the President of the Financial Action Task Force stated, "[y]et another area of
interest is the application of AMLJCFT standards to microfinance." Asmal, supra
note 1, at 11.
26. Porteous, supra note 24.
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two concerns are a part of the larger dilemma. Developing nations that
do not implement sufficient AML/CFT regimes risk being "frozen out of
the international financial system," because bank regulators in developed
countries will increasingly "discourage their institutions from conducting
financial transactions with banks in high risk countries. '27 To ensure
long-term sustainability and meet client needs, financial institutions in de-
veloping nations must not allow themselves to be exploited by money
launderers and terrorists. 28 Most importantly, while MFIs strive to com-
ply with AML/CFT regulations, they must not sacrifice their primary mis-
sion to provide poor people with financial services.29
In 2000, the U.S. Congress passed legislation establishing microfinance
as a critical component of U.S. foreign assistance. 30 At the time, national
security considerations may not have motivated this legislation. But in
2002, speaking about the intersection of poverty and terrorism, President
George W. Bush stated, "[p]overty does not make poor people into ter-
rorists .... Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak
states vulnerable to terrorist networks ... within their borders."'3 1 Infor-
mal and feeble financial systems are vulnerable to terrorist exploitation.
Combating terrorist financing may be best accomplished by bringing
the world's poorest people into the formal financial sector via
microfinance. Some argue that helping the world's poor will alleviate the
problem of terrorism because poverty breeds animosity towards wealth-
ier nations. These advocates urge large, western nations to invest fewer
resources in national security and more in helping the poor. But both
investments are necessary. AML/CFT regulations should be applied to
microfinance without compromising on the core principles of increased
transparency and customer identification. These rules, which exist to
make advanced financial systems safer and more stable, will also enhance
the quality of services delivered to the poor. Encouraging the expansion
of the microfinance industry without compromising AML/CFT regula-
tions should be a top national security and humanitarian priority of the
United States.
II. MICROFINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA
Microfinance is a significant element of the Latin American
macroeconomic picture. Market coverage of the microfinance industry in
Latin America varies from country to country between 56 percent and
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. AML/CFT IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 9.
30. Coleman, supra note 22, at 184 (citing The Microenterprise for Self-Reliance and
International Anti-Corruption Act of 2000, H.R. 1143, 106th Cong. (2000)).
31. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
nsc/nss.pdf.
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less than 1 percent.32 Moreover, while much of the market in South
America involves MFIs of indigenous origin, a unique feature of the Cen-
tral American microfinance market is that MFIs affiliated with mainly
U.S.-based networks, including ACCION, FINCA, and Opportunity In-
ternational,33 tend to enjoy the largest coverage. 34
A. LEGAL FORMS OF MICROFINANCE ENTITIES
Organizational structures of Latin American microfinance entities may
be divided into two broad categories: unregulated and regulated institu-
tions. Within the category of regulated institutions further subdivisions
exist: transformed NGOs, specially licensed microfinance companies, and
commercial banks. Each of these organizational forms may be identified
by unique characteristics.
1. Unregulated Institutions
Latin American microfinance began in the 1980s with religious and so-
cially-motivated NGOs. 35 In the beginning, MFI growth "was funded
largely by grants and soft loans from donors and governments in the re-
gion."'36 These traditional, unregulated NGOs confronted very few barri-
ers to entry into the microfinance market. But due to their unregulated
nature, the scope of activities and services offered were typically limited
to microcredit products. Currently, unregulated NGOs are the most
common form of MFI in the Latin American region.37
2. Regulated Institutions-Transformed NGOs and Specially Licensed
Companies
Transformed NGOs and specially licensed microfinance companies op-
erate as regulated entities. Traditionally, MFIs were organized as NGOs
and received most funding "from multilateral development agencies and,
to a smaller extent, private charities and host governments. ' 38 The first
NGO to convert into a regulated MFI in Latin America was a Bolivian
NGO, Prodem, which converted in 1992 into a regulated commercial
32. BEATRIZ MARULANDA & MARIA OTERO, THE PROFILE OF MICROFINANCE IN
LATIN AMERICA IN 10 YEARS: VISION & CHARACTERISTICS 14 (2005), available at
http://www.accion.org/file-download.asp?f=23 [hereinafter PROFILE OF MICRO-
FINANCE]. This report indicates the corresponding market coverage rates: Bo-
livia-55.7 percent, Peru-26.2 percent, Colombia-13.6 percent, Mexico-6.8 percent,
Guatemala-6.0 percent, Honduras-3.9 percent, Venezuela-0.8 percent. Id.
33. Opportunity International is a microfinance organization "[m]otivated by Jesus
Christ's call to serve the poor" and dedicated to "[g]iving the poor a working
chance." Opportunity International, http://www.opportunity.org (last visited May
15, 2006).
34. CGAP CASE STUDY, supra note 11, at 2.
35. ALVARO RAMIREZ, THE MICROFINANCE EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN 2 (2004), available at http://www.adbi.org/files/2004.10.04.cpp.
microfinance. latinamerica.carribean.pdf.
36. Id.
37. PROFILE OF MICROFINANCE, supra note 32, at 5.
38. IMF MICROFINANCE, supra note 13, at 3.
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bank, BancoSol.39 Since then, other MFIs in Latin America, which were
originally formed as NGOs, have "transformed or 'upscaled'," into MFIs
regulated by their country's banking authorities. 40 On a regional level:
Latin America is clearly leading the way in transforming
microfinance from a subsistence activity to a profitable business. In
no other region of the world are there as many financially sustaina-
ble microfinance institutions ....
... Not only are many Latin American microfinance institutions sus-
tainable, but in several cases they are also very profitable. 41
In recent years, several countries have passed legislation creating new
types of specialized financial institutions designed to serve the
microfinance sector. 42 Eleven different types of institutions now exist in
Latin America for microfinance purposes. 43 Specially licensed companies
are distinct from transformed NGOs in that they become licensed "under
a special law for microfinance ... rather than under the general banking
law."'44 Growing "numbers of MFIs are getting licensed as banks or spe-
cialized finance companies," enabling them to seek financing "by acces-
sing capital markets and mobilizing deposits from large institutional
investors as well as poor clients. '45
3. Regulated Institutions-Commercial Banks
The third group of Latin American MFIs includes commercial banks
that, in recent years, have downscaled their operations by reaching out to
a poorer clientele. 46 Some banks create a special microfinance division
for conducting interactions with microfinance clients.47 Other large, pub-
lic banks enter the market with a political and social mission.48 Commer-
cial bank characteristics, such as well-established internal controls and
comprehensive administrative and accounting systems, instill these banks
with operational structures that enable favorable performance within the
microfinance sector.49 Traditional commercial banks, leveraging these
structural systems, may successfully compete in the microfinance indus-
39. RAMIREZ, supra note 35, at 2.
40. PROFILE OF MICROFINANCE, supra note 32, at 5.
41. TOR JANSSON, MICROFINANCE: FROM VILLAGE TO WALL STREET 3 (2001), availa-
ble at http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/MSMll3VillagetoWallStreetJANSSON.pdf.
42. Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 40.
43. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 18. The countries creating these
institutions include Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
and Venezuela. Id.
44. ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN, OCCASIONAL PAPER No.5: COMMERCIALIZATION AND
MISSION DRIFT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MICROFINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 5
(2001), available at http://www.cgap.org/docs/OccasionalPaper_05.pdf.
45. Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 39.
46. RAMIREZ, supra note 35, at 2-3.
47. PROFILE OF MICROFINANCE, supra note 32, at 5.
48. Notably, "these public banks are the largest suppliers of microcredit in" Brazil and
Chile. Id.
49. CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR, Focus No.12: COMMERCIAL BANKS
IN MICROFINANCE: NEW ACTORS IN THE MICROFINANCE WORLD 2 (1998), availa-
ble at http://www.cgap.org/docs/FocusNote-12.pdf.
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try. For example, Banco do Nordeste, a commercial bank in Brazil, main-
tains an average outstanding loan balance of US$253. 50 In fact, the
manager of the Multilateral Investment Fund stated, "'[m]icrofinance is
the fastest growing, most stable market for Latin American banks .... It
is a huge untapped market and there is money to be made."' 5'
Trends toward regulated MFIs and commercial banks represent the
commercialization or maturation of microfinance in Latin America.52
Commercialization of microfinance has occurred faster in Latin America
than anywhere else in the world.53 Commercial banks now provide 29
percent of microenterprise funds, while transformed NGOs and special-
ized MFIs provide another 45 percent. 54 Unregulated NGOs supply ap-
proximately 25 percent of all loans to microenterprises in Latin
America. 55 Shifts to more sustainable models of microfinance will con-
tinue to occur.
B. MICROFINANCE SERVICES
As a result of the commercialization of microfinance, MFIs are offering
a greater spectrum of services and products. MFIs in the form of unregu-
lated NGOs offer predominantly credit products and tend to serve a
lower income niche than regulated MFIs. Thus, "the average [loan size]
for unregulated NGOs (US$322) is roughly a third that for regulated
[MFIs] (US$803)." 56 On the other hand, regulated entities typically offer
additional financial services including savings, insurance, and remittances.
Remittance services require special attention. In Latin America alone,
301 million people are affected by poverty, but many of these are being
helped by remittances. 57 MFIs, particularly in the Central America-Mex-
ico region, could seize on a significant business opportunity "to capture
and channel these funds."'58 Although total worldwide remittance
amounts are hard to calculate with accuracy, the most recent estimates
suggest global remittances amount to approximately $140 billion and
about $80 billion of that is sent to developing countries.59 The United
States is by far the largest source of remittances, while Mexico is the larg-
50. CHRISTEN, supra note 44, at 15.
51. Posting of Rob Katz to NextBillion.net-Development Through Enterprise, http://
www.nextbillion.net/newsroom/2005/11/23/banks-to-leverage-remittances-for-
microfinance-in-latin-america (Nov. 23, 2005, 08:13) [hereinafter Katz].
52. See CHRISTEN, supra note 44, at 4.
53. Id. at 1.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 13-14.
57. Diego Cevallos, Latin America: Remittances Rescue Millions from Poverty, INTER
PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 25, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?
idnews=31189.
58. CGAP CASE STUDY, supra note 11, at 14.
59. DANIEL M. LEIBSOHN, INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES: CHARACTERISTICS AND
COMPARISONS 2 (2004), available at http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/cache/
documents/65853.doc.
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est recipient country.60 According to the IDB, $45.8 billion was remitted
by migrant workers to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2004-with
Mexico receiving over $16.6 billion.61 Over 60 percent of global remit-
tance growth in the past three years may be attributed to these Latin
American countries.62 Furthermore, IDB President Luis Alberto
Moreno, at the 2005 Latin American Federation of Banks Conference,
stated that Latin America remittance totals were "expected to surpass
US$55 [billion]" in 2005 with only 10 percent being transferred through
the financial system. 63 With so many money transfers occurring outside
the formal financial system, these remitted funds remain susceptible to
terrorist exploitation.
As microfinance services expand to include remittance services, billions
of dollars will-to the benefit of poor people-be brought into the stabil-
ity of the formal financial system. Where these microfinance remittance
providers are subject to appropriate AML/CFT regulation, the purposes
of these funds will be disclosed. In 2005 alone, if relevant microfinance
systems and AML/CFT regulations had been in place, $50 billion remit-
ted from the United States to Mexico would have safely and securely
benefited the poor. Instead, the absence of these funds from the formal
financial system leaves open the question whether these U.S.-generated
dollars are at risk of being used to finance terror against the very country
providing the funds.
Savings services are also increasing rapidly. Data indicates that sav-
ings, also known as deposit-taking, by MFIs in nine major microfinance
markets64 "increased from US$500 million in 2000 to US$1.2 billion in
2003."65 Client demand for one-stop shopping is motivating MFIs to pro-
vide these savings services. 66 But another significant impetus to offer sav-
ings services is that MFI growth is rapidly exceeding the availability of
traditional funding sources, and deposits provide an additional source of
funding.6 7
C. FINANCING MICROFINANCE
As the microfinance industry enlarges, MFIs will have four sources of
funds to finance future growth: donors, client savings, local debt and eq-
uity, and international debt and equity. 68  Debt financing for
microfinance has been used by multilateral and government development
60. Id.
61. World Council of Credit Unions, International Remittance Network, http://www.
woccu.org/prod-serv/irnet/index.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
62. Id.
63. Katz, supra note 51.
64. "The 9 markets are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico,




68. JANSSON, supra note 41, at 14.
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agencies for fifteen years. 69 Even some local banks have gotten involved
as several Latin American MFIs "have tapped local debt markets, largely
by issuing private placements taken up by local financial institutions. '70
Although equity investments in microfinance have been less common,
these investments may now be one of the most popular in the market.
Investors range from large banks to single individuals. Deutsche Bank,
citing successful experiences with investment in microfinance through lo-
cal banking partners, set up a consortium in November 2005 to invest
US$75 million in microfinance. 71 Another organization, Kiva, permits in-
dividuals to act as global financiers and supply funds directly to
microfinance clients over the Internet. 72 The flourishing field of
microfinance is receiving an influx of new forms of financing.
D. REGULATION
Latin American MFIs are commonly regulated under a general bank-
ing law rather than under a separate microfinance-specific law.73
Interestingly:
[s]upervision and regulation of microfinance can be a double-edged
sword. When properly conceived and implemented, laws and super-
visory structures can provide the stability, predictability and support
that MFIs need to thrive and that are necessary to protect the sav-
ings of the poor. However, inappropriate systems - those that are
not adapted to characteristics of microfinance, or those not aligned
with the local realities of the microfinance industry - will not foster
MFI growth.74
As MFI services and legal forms evolve, new questions of regulation
arise; policymakers must confront a choice of whether to regulate activi-
ties or institutions. 75
Distinguishing between institutional and functional activity regulation
is necessary. Institutional regulation occurs in many countries where
MFIs are considered a specific type of entity and are regulated by a sepa-
69. Id. at 15-16.
70. Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 39.
71. Ximena Escobar de Nogales, supra note 19, at 34; Deutsche Bank, Launch of the
Global Commercial Microfinance Consortium, http://www.deutsche-bank.de/csrl
en/poollSoziales_3247.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
72. Steve Hargreaves, Be a Global Financier... On a Shoestring, CNN, Jan. 17, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/17/pf/kivamicrofinance/index.htm; Kiva, http://
www.kiva.org.
73. STEFAN STASCHEN, REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR MICROFINANCE: A COM-
PARISON OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN 11 COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE 7 (2003), availa-
ble at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/3769_.03769.pdf.
74. SUPERVISING & REGULATING MICROFINANCE, supra note 18, at 10.
75. JANSSON, supra note 41, at 9. The report states "[c]urrently, Latin American
microfinance NGOs that wish to become regulated entities often times face a very
unattractive choice: they can either seek a license as a commercial bank, which
involves demanding entry standards..., or as a finance company, which may not
permit deposit-taking." Id. at 10.
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rate microfinance law.76 But a functional regulatory approach regards
microfinance as a particular financial activity, and MFIs are regulated
"according to the economic function they perform, regardless of their in-
stitutional structure. ' 77 Understanding these two approaches is helpful
when applying AML/CFT regulatory regimes to the microfinance indus-
try. Moreover, understanding the microfinance regulatory environment
is simplified by briefly examining the systems of Bolivia, Mexico, and
Colombia.
1. Bolivia
Bolivia has led the way among Latin American countries for
microfinance. This success is the result of a system of specialized
microfinance regulation that encourages entities to formalize their opera-
tions. 78 As microfinance was emerging, Bolivian policymakers and regu-
lators established a specific institutional structure for microfinance
market participants. The Law on Banks and Financial Entities created
fondos financieros privados, a specialized type of financial institution for
the microfinance market. 79 Due to these provisions, many Bolivian
microfinance providers began operation as regulated entities, and there-
fore, the entire industry developed as a specialized niche within the finan-
cial system.80 Although regulation targeted at MFIs may have slowed
conventional banks' entry into the microfinance market, some commer-
cial banks are beginning to enter the market by lending to microfinance
NGOs.8t Bolivia's favorable regulatory environment enables the country
to boast the highest microfinance market penetration of all Latin Ameri-
can nations. 82
2. Mexico
Historically, Mexico focused little attention on microfinance regulation
and lagged behind the rest of Latin America in microfinance growth and
performance. 83  Yet, in 2001, Mexico initiated regulation of the
microfinance sector by establishing a delegated system where federations
of MFI representatives act as self-regulators. 84 Additionally, President
Fox's administration created a Division of Microenterprise within the
Ministry of the Economy to encourage the coordination of microfinance
initiatives. 85 But according to several experts, the Mexican microfinance
industry would be helped most by regulations, similar to Bolivian regula-
76. STASCHEN, supra note 73, at 15.
77. Id.
78. SUPERVISING & REGULATING MICROFINANCE, supra note 18, at 10.
79. STASCHEN, supra note 73, at 7.
80. SUPERVISING & REGULATING MICROFINANCE, supra note 18, at 14.
81. Id.
82. PROFILE OF MICROFINANCE, supra note 32, at 14.
83. SUPERVISING & REGULATING MICROFINANCE, supra note 18, at 20.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id. at 20.
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tions, making it easier for specialized microfinance entities to emerge. 86
If the Mexican government acts aggressively to create a financial regula-
tory environment conducive to microfinance, then MFIs in Mexico will
expand rapidly.
3. Colombia
Colombian authorities exerted little effort to regulate microfinance un-
til recently.8 7 During 2002, banking regulators established a reporting
category for microloans and exhorted commercial banks to extend a sig-
nificant amount of capital to the microfinance industry.88 Yet the Colom-
bian regulatory environment remains vastly different from that of
Bolivia. The specialized category of regulated institutions in Colombia
has not encouraged NGOs to transform into regulated entities as has oc-
curred in Bolivia. 89 Moreover, any advantages of transformation were
eliminated by the additional costs of becoming regulated. 90 But in 2003,
regulators began addressing some of these drawbacks by allowing special-
ized microfinance entities to offer savings accounts and borrow from con-
ventional commercial banks.91 It remains unclear whether these
incentives will persuade NGOs to transform into regulated entities.
Perhaps the government's most compelling tool for advancing
microfinance is "directed credit."'92 Under this concept, the government
"direct[s] banks to invest in microfinance both as retailers and as whole-
salers, through lending to NGOs" and specially regulated MFIs. 93 Al-
though government intrusion in the financial system may seem
counterintuitive to microfinance and the expansion of capitalistic finan-
cial markets, a prod from the Colombian authorities may make all the
difference in the growth of microfinance in Colombia.
E. SUMMARY
As a consequence of the increasing commercialization and sophistica-
tion of Latin American microfinance operations, the industry is now led
by regulated financial entities. 94 Commercial banks and specialized insti-
tutions dominate a sector that was once the exclusive domain of NGOs.
These MFIs offer expanded services including savings, insurance, and re-
mittances. New sources of financing are necessary to support this
microfinance growth. As entities evolve, services spread, and financing
flourishes, appropriate regulations must be implemented. Successful reg-
ulatory systems must conform to the unique needs of each nation's
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 18.
93. Id.
94. JANSSON, supra note 41, at 2.
20061
558 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12
microfinance industry. Understanding these microfinance trends and re-
alities is essential to effectively incorporate AML/CFT regulations with
microfinance operations.
III. AML/CFT REGULATIONS
A. OVERVIEW OF REGULATION-
PRUDENTIAL VS. NON-PRUDENTIAL
Before examining relevant AML/CFT regulations, it is helpful to un-
derstand an aspect of banking and financial system regulation: prudential
and non-prudential regulation. Prudential regulation aims "at protecting
the financial system as a whole as well as protecting the safety of small
deposits in individual institutions" and "involves the government in over-
seeing the financial soundness of the regulated institutions. ' 95 Moreover,
[p]rudential regulation is generally much more complex, difficult,
and expensive than most types of non-prudential regulation. Pru-
dential regulations (for instance, capital adequacy norms or reserve
and liquidity requirements) almost always require a specialized fi-
nancial authority for their implementation, whereas non-prudential
regulation . . . may often be largely self-executed and can often be
dealt with by other than the financial authorities. 96
Microfinance does not jeopardize most, if any, nations' financial sys-
tems on a macroeconomic level. Furthermore, where microfinance enti-
ties only offer credit products, no customer deposits are at risk. In such
situations, no prudential regulation should be applied because the impli-
cations of an entity collapse are marginal in relation to a nation's overall
economic health. Additionally, compliance with prudential regulations
may present inordinately difficult challenges to emerging MFIs working
to establish sustainable and profitable operations. 97 As the IMF reports,
"[u]nder current circumstances, the costs of bringing MFIs into pruden-
tial supervision would probably exceed the associated benefits in the ma-
jority of countries." 98
Because prudential regulation targets large, sophisticated financial in-
stitutions, microfinance entities do not come under the purview of such
regulation. But in the case of an increasing number of MFIs where de-
posit and other services are available, prudential regulation would be pru-
dent.99 Yet in many countries, the most important regulatory issues
confronting the microfinance industry are non-prudential. 1°°
95. ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN ET AL., MICROFINANCE CONSENSUS GUIDELINES: GUID-
ING PRINCIPLES ON REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF MICROFINANCE 7 (2003),
available at http://microfinancegateway.org/files/13473-13473.pdf [hereinafter
MICROFINANCE GUIDELINES].
96. Id.
97. IMF MICROFINANCE, supra note 13, at 13.
98. Id.
99. MICROFINANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 8.
100. Id.
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Non-prudential regulation is more decentralized than prudential regu-
lation. Non-prudential regulation may be imposed by general commer-
cial laws and administered by the government agencies that usually
implement those laws. 10 1 But non-prudential regulation usually consists
of and "relies on the enforcement of a set of... laws, and regulations that
are self-executed by" the affected entities or an organization of affiliated
entities. 10 2 Most importantly, non-prudential regulation "tend[s] to be
easier to enforce and less costly than prudential regulation." 10 3 Within
the microfinance context, non-prudential regulation addresses issues such
as fraud prevention and financial crimes. 10 4
Determining when prudential regulation should apply to microfinance
entities is an interesting question but one that will not be examined by
this paper. More relevant to this paper is determining whether policies
and procedures concerning AML/CFT activities should be imposed by
the government and categorized as prudential or treated as non-pruden-
tial and self-regulated by microfinance entities. The remainder of Part III
examines existing international and domestic AML/CFT regulatory
standards.
B. INTERNATIONAL AML/CFT STANDARDS-
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
1. United Nations
After September 11, 2001, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1373 (UNSCR 1373).105 UNSCR 1373 laid a foundation for
the establishment of an international framework of financial regulation.
The resolution succinctly stated its objective to "[p]revent and suppress
the financing of terrorist acts."'1 6 In addition to its focus on curtailing
terrorist exploitation of the financial services industry,10 7 UNSCR 1373
exhorts all nations to, "[b]ecome parties as soon as possible to the rele-
vant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, includ-
ing the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
101. Id. at 7.
102. IMF MICROFINANCE, supra note 13, at 14.
103. MICROFINANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 31.
104. Id. at 10.
105. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, Mandate, http://www.un.org/ sc/
ctc/mandate.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
106. S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1(a), U.N. Doc. SIRES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.un.orgIDocs/sc/committees/1373/resolutions.html (follow "SIRES/ 1373
(2001)" hyperlink).
107. Id. at para. 1(d) (stating:
[All states shall] [p]rohibit their nationals or any persons and entities
within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or eco-
nomic resources or financial or other related services available, directly
or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to com-
mit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of enti-
ties owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of
persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such
persons.)
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Terrorism of 9 December 1999."10 8
UNSCR 1373 anticipated compliance with the resolution to occur over
a three-phase implementation period. Initially, nations will be en-
couraged to adopt appropriate legislation that should include proactive
measures to prevent and suppress terrorist financing. 10 9 After developing
legislation, states should develop and strengthen effective "executive ma-
chinery" for the administration and enforcement of legal regimes that
suppress terrorist financing. 110  Finally, states must enhance
"[c]ooperation on bilateral, regional and international levels" as well as
cooperation in judicial actions to support the objectives of UNSCR
1373.111
Additionally, an inspection procedure has been established to ensure
that nations comply with the provisions of UNSCR 1373. In March 2005,
the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) issued guidance indicating that
on-site inspection teams would have four objectives: (1) analysis of states'
implementation of 1373 obligations, (2) analysis of a states' capacity to
fulfill 1373 obligations, (3) identification of areas where states could use
technical assistance in order to comply with 1373, and (4) recommenda-
tions to states for more effective implementation of 1373 provisions.11 2
Inspectors will focus on a member states': (1) scope of anti-terrorism leg-
islation, (2) existing measures applied against assets used for criminal
purposes, (3) effectiveness of law enforcement services, (4) extent of in-
ternational cooperation, and (5) territorial control.113 Essentially, the
CTC appears to be positioning itself as an international observer of mem-
ber states' financial and banking systems.
2. Bank
The Bank works singularly and in conjunction with its sister organiza-
tion, the IMF, to provide technical assistance on regulatory issues. De-
mand for technical assistance from the Bank has increased as countries
"become more aware of AML/CFT requirements." ' 1 4 Special effort is
being devoted to the development of international best practices regard-
ing two areas: remittance systems and non-profit organizations. 115 First,
108. Id. at para. 3(d).
109. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, States' Reports, http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/committees/1373/reports.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, Framework Document for CTC
Visits to States in Order to Enhance the Monitoring of the Implementation of Reso-
lution 1373, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/frameworkdocument.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
113. Id.
114. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND & WORLD BANK, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: OBSERVATIONS FROM THE
WORK PROGRAM AND IMPLICATIONS GOING FORWARD 14 (2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/083105.pdf [hereinafter AML/CFT
OBSERVATIONS].
115. Id. at 15.
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both the Bank and the IMF have focused significant effort on remit-
tances. The Bank has worked with the Consultative Group to Assist the
Poor (CGAP) to examine better ways of integrating remittances into
microfinance business models. 116 Second, the Bank has worked to under-
stand the AML/CFT risks inherent to NGOs. The Bank wants to protect
NGOs from terrorist exploitation without impeding the global flow of
charitable contributions. 117 Accordingly, the Bank reports, "[w]ork is
ongoing with the [CGAP]... on appropriate approaches for the applica-
tion of customer-identification measures by service providers catering to
low-income customers." 118 Compliance with customer identification reg-
ulations can be a difficult task for many microfinance entities because
clientele often do not have adequate identifying records.
Another area of the Bank's work is developing a risk-based approach
to AML/CFT regulatory implementation.1 19 As the Bank indicates,
"[tihe risk-based approach is of great interest to many countries because
it allows a targeted assignment of regulatory resources to higher-risk ar-
eas." 120 The Bank is leveraging its knowledge of risk-profiles in the
microfinance industry to design AML/CFT regulatory frameworks that
are proportionate to each country.1 2 ' Essentially, the Bank aspires to
itemize and prioritize a phased-in implementation of relevant AML/CFT
regulations based on individual country conditions.
3. IMF
The IMF adds to the work of the United Nations and the Bank.
1 22
While most aspects of microfinance fall under the purview of the Bank,
the IMF and the Bank work closely together on a variety of issues.
123
Although the IMF has long been involved with efforts to curtail money
laundering, the organization intensified its work to combat terrorism fi-
nancing after the events of September 11, 2001.124 Seeking to build on its
reputation "[a]s a collaborative institution with near universal member-
116. Id.




121. Id. at 19.
122. International Monetary Fund, The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering
and the Financing of Terrorism, Sept. 2005, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/
facts/ aml.htm [hereinafter IMF Factsheet].
123. The IMF and the Bank identified "Key AML/CFT Implementation Challenges":
" Slow progress in implementing effective AML/CFT regimes;
" Insufficient coordination among national agencies;
" Obstacles to international cooperation;
• Underdeveloped tools for financial institutions to identify specific
risks ... ;
" Lack of adequate training at many levels; and
" Difficulties in designing and implementing balanced regulations for re-
mittance service providers and non-profit organizations.
AML/CFT OBSERVATIONS, supra note 114, at 20.
124. IMF Factsheet, supra note 122.
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ship" the IMF has focused on three objectives: (1) conducting assess-
ments of AML/CFT legal and regulatory regimes in accordance with the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, (2) offering technical as-
sistance, in conjunction with the Bank, to help countries strengthen "their
legal, regulatory and financial supervisory" systems, and (3) developing
policy ideas based on international best practices. 125
Since March 2004, the IMF has regularly assessed the anti-money laun-
dering regimes of more than fifty countries 126 using the FATF Forty Rec-
ommendations as the standard for its assessments.1 27 The IMF also
provides technical assistance to help countries comply with the FATF
standards.1 28 In respect to microfinance, the IMF has indicated that "[t]o
the extent that microfinance institutions become vulnerable to money
laundering and terrorist financing, [technical assistance] programs will be
developed to help countries integrate this sector into the AML/CFT re-
gime without unintended consequences on the access to finance by any
segment of society. ' 129 The IMF has successfully sought to establish itself
as the international supervisor of nations' AML/CFT regulatory regimes.
4. FA TF
The FATF, created in 1989, is an intergovernmental body that develops
and promotes national and international policies "to combat money laun-
dering and terrorist financing. ' 130 Comprised of thirty-three members in-
cluding the United States, Mexico, and Canada, FATF "works to
generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative
and regulatory reforms in these areas. ' 131 The organization works closely
with the United Nations, the Bank, the IMF, and FATF-style regional
bodies (FSRBs). 132 The Financial Action Task Force of South America
Against Money Laundering (GAFISUD) is a FSRB established in De-
cember 2000. GAFISUD includes nine member countries1 33 from South
America who are working "to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing as set out in the FATF Forty Recommendations and... Special
125. Id.
126. IMF SURVEY, supra note 5, at 242.
127. IMF Factsheet, supra note 122.
128. IMF SURVEY, supra note 5, at 242.
129. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND & WORLD BANK, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: OBSERVATIONS FROM THE
WORK PROGRAM AND IMPLICATIONS GOING FORWARD: SUPPLEMENTARY INFOR-
MATION 30 (2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/
083105s.pdf.
130. FATF, What is the FATF?, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/57/0,2340,en-3225
0379_32235720_34432121_11_11,00.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
131. Id.
132. IMF Factsheet, supra note 122.
133. GAFISUD, About GAFISUD, http://www.gafisud.org/home.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2006). The nine member countries include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Id.
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Recommendations."' 134 FATF published the Forty Recommendations
and Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing to propagate perti-
nent policy ideas for combating money laundering and terrorist
financing. 135
a. The Forty Recommendations
Currently, more than 150 nations are committed to implementing the
Forty Recommendations. 136 Under the Forty Recommendations, FATF
defines financial institutions to include "any institution involved in finan-
cial transactions, including financial service providers working with low-
income clients. ' 137 But the definition of financial institutions, which
would otherwise include microfinance institutions, includes the caveat
that "[w]hen a financial activity is carried out by a person or entity on an
occasional or very limited basis ... such that there is little risk of money
laundering activity occurring, a country may decide that the application
of anti-money laundering measures is not necessary, either fully or par-
tially. 1 38 This language embraces the notion of risk-based supervision
and regulation.1 39 In addition to the basic definitions, the Forty Recom-
mendations address other issues such as reporting of suspicious transac-
tions, record-keeping, and customer due diligence.1 40
b. Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
Although the Forty Recommendations carry substantial weight in
forming AML/CFT regulatory regimes, the Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing address significant areas that are more relevant to the
microfinance industry. Three Special Recommendations require specific
consideration. First, Special Recommendation VI deals with alternative
remittance systems by seeking to ensure that consistent AML/CFT mea-
sures are imposed on all forms of value transfer services both informal
and formal.1 41 This recommendation takes on greater significance as
MFIs increasingly offer remittance services.
134. FATF, Financial Action Task Force of South America Against Money Laundering
(GAFISUD), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/35/0,2340,en_32250379 32236869_
34355875 1 11 1,00.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
135. FATF, FATF Standards, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2966,en 32250379_322369
20 _1 _11 1,00.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
136. Asmal, supra note 1.
137. AML/CFT IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 3.
138. FATF, Forty Recommendations Glossary, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/glossary/0,2586,
en_32250379_32236889_35433764_11 1_,00.html#34289432 (last visited Feb. 10,
2006).
139. AML/CFT OBSERVATIONS, supra note 114, at 7.
140. AML/CFT IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
141. FATF, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING 2 (2004), availa-
ble at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf. Special Recommenda-
tion VI states that:
[e]ach country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal enti-
ties, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of
money or value, including transmission through an informal money or
value transfer system or network, should be licensed or registered and
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Another recommendation, Special Recommendation VII, addresses
wire transfer services. 142 MFIs providing remittance services via wire
transfers should comply with the recommendation. According to FATF,
the objective of Special Recommendation VII is to prevent "terrorists...
from having unfettered access to wire transfers for moving their funds
and for detecting such misuse when it occurs." 143 FATF suggests that
cross-border wire transfer transactions, which surpass a country's de
minimis threshold, 144 should be accompanied by the originator's address,
or "countries may permit financial institutions to substitute the address
with a national identity number, customer identification number, or date
and place of birth. ' 145
Third, Special Recommendation VIII applies where MFIs organize as
NGOs. The recommendation focuses on NGO exposure "to terrorist fi-
nancing, and requires countries to develop regulation to prevent these
organizations from becoming conduits for money laundering or the fi-
nancing of terrorism. '146 These FATF Forty Recommendations and the
nine Special Recommendations form the foundation of international ter-
rorist financing regulation.
C. DOMESTIC AML/CFr STANDARDS - THE UNITED STATES
The United States has led the way in domestic AML/CF[ regulatory
development and implementation. After September 11, 2001, the United
States adopted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001, also known as the USA PATRIOT ACT (the Act). 14 7 Title III sec-
tion 359 of the Act 148 expanded the definition of a financial institution to
subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-
bank financial institutions.
Id.
142. Id. at 2. Special Recommendation VII states that:
[c]ountries should take measures to require financial institutions, includ-
ing money remitters, to include accurate and meaningful originator infor-
mation (name, address and account number) on funds transfers and
related messages that are sent, and the information should remain with
the transfer or related message through the payment chain. Countries
should take measures to ensure that financial institutions, including
money remitters, conduct enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for suspi-
cious activity funds transfers which do not contain complete originator
information (name, address and account number).
Id.
143. FATF, REVISED INTERPRETATIVE NOTE TO SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION VII:
WIRE TRANSFERS 1 (2005), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/34/56/
3500 2635.pdf.
144. Id. at 2. FATF suggest that if a country adopts a de minimis threshold, then the
obligations of tracing, reporting, and disclosure should not apply to transactions
below that amount. Id.
145. Id.
146. AML/CFr IMPLICATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
147. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
148. Id. § 359(a) (defining a financial institution as:
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cover microfinance institutions. MFIs must comply with regulations af-
fecting transparency and customer identification procedures.
Various financial services, including money services businesses and in-
formal value transfer systems, have been regulated to enhance trans-
parency and disclosure. 14 9 Regulations require institutions to: register
with the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-
work, 150 file Suspicious Activity Reports for relevant transactions, 5 1 and
satisfy recordkeeping requirements. Registration requirements include
providing information on ownership, geographic locations, and opera-
tional details.' 52
Customer identification programs are another important aspect of the
American regulatory regime. On May 9, 2003, the Treasury Department
issued final rules implementing section 326 of the Act. These rules re-
quire "certain financial institutions to establish procedures to verify the
identity of new accountholders."'1 53 Regulated institutions must "obtain
and review identifying information for new customers, verify that the in-
formation is correct, [and] retain records of the reviews. ' 154 U.S. regula-
tions regarding customer identification programs surpass the scope of
FATF's Forty Recommendations. 55 And although the:
Rules do not apply to a foreign branch of an insured US bank ...
each bank is "encouraged" by Treasury and the federal banking
agencies to implement an effective customer identification program
throughout its organization, including in its foreign branches, except
to the extent that the requirements of the Rules would conflict with
local foreign law. 156
a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a busi-
ness in the transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a
business in an informal money transfer system or any network of people
who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domesti-
cally or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions
system).
149. James F. Sloan, Informal Value Transfer Systems, 2003 FINCEN ADVISORY, 33,
available at http://www.fincen.gov/advis33.pdf.
150. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-Definitions Relating to, and
Registration of, Money Services Businesses, 64 Fed. Reg. 45438, 45439 (Aug. 20,
1999) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103), available at http://www.msb.gov/ pdf/
msbregl.pdf.
151. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act
Regulations-Requirement that Money Transmitters and Money Order and Trav-
eler's Check Issuers, Sellers, and Redeemers Report Suspicious Transactions, 65
Fed. Reg. 13683, 13684 (Mar. 14, 2000) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103), availa-
ble at http://www.fincen.gov/msbreg.pdf.
152. Special Rules for Money Services Businesses, 31 C.F.R. § 103.41 (1999).
153. JOHN REVEAL, HOMELAND SEC. CLIENT ALERT: FINAL RULES IMPLEMENTING
SECTION 326 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT FOR BANKS: CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES (2003), available at http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Jun/2/132853.pdf.
154. Id.
155. Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit Unions
and Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 25090 (May 9, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/326bankfinal.pdf.
156. REVEAL, supra note 153, at 2.
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The United States has led the way in developing a comprehensive do-
mestic regulatory regime. Rules promoting transparency and customer
identification programs strengthen MFIs and benefit clientele. But the
United States needs to ensure that its legal and regulatory developments
are coordinated with advancing international standards. In an era of
globalization, the success of American regulation depends on the success
of other nations' regulations.
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
The expansion of microfinance coupled with the implementation of
AML/CFT regulations will increase peace and decrease poverty. Refusal
to implement any AML/CFT regulation in a post-9/11 world must be out
of the question. But determining how to apply AML/CFT regimes to
microfinance is a challenging issue. Two primary approaches have
emerged: risk-based implementation and comprehensive implementation.
A. RISK-BASED AML/CFT REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION
Since the microfinance industry is growing at different rates in various
countries, some policymakers contend that taking a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach to AML/CFT regulation would irresponsibly inhibit the positive
effects of microfinance. 157 These proponents claim that a cookie-cutter
strategy would fail to take into consideration differing national laws, nu-
merous MFI organizational structures, and the variety of services of-
fered. 158 Supporters of a risk-based implementation of AML/CFT
regulations claim:
[t]he need for a set of regulations tailored to each different type of
institution engaged in microfinance can be justified by the fact that
their different organizational, operational and ownership structures
create risks and weaknesses that are unique to each type of financial
entity. The application of a differentiated regulatory framework,
however, is complicated by the variety of financial institutions en-
gaged in microfinance activities. 15 9
CGAP, the preeminent advisory institution for the microfinance indus-
try, supports "(1) gradual implementation of new measures; (2) the adop-
tion of a risk-based approach to regulation; and (3) the use of exemptions
for low-risk categories of transactions. ' 160 CGAP proposes that the im-
plementation of AML/CFT regulations should occur within the context of
a risk-based assessment because "the risk of money laundering or financ-
ing of terrorism varies with the country context, the institution's legal
157. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 50.
158. Id. (stating that "[i]n view of the considerable diversity of financial institutions
engaged in microfinance, supervisory authorities cannot apply a standard approach
to all of them. The different types of institutions differ significantly in terms of
their ownership, organizational structure, operations and overall risk profiles.").
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form, and the type of financial service. '1 61
Using a risk-based implementation approach makes sense for several
reasons. First, the typical microfinance client profile may reduce the risk
of MFIs being used for money laundering purposes. 16 2 Second,
microfinance transactions-whether credit, savings, or remittances-are
relatively small.1 63 Small transaction amounts may lessen the risk that
MFIs will be exploited by terrorists by not attracting big money.
Despite these factors in favor of risk-based implementation, several
reasons discourage such an approach. First, even small dollar transac-
tions are of increasing concern. 164 In fact, FATF experts agree "that the
funding needed to mount a terrorist attack does not always call for large
sums of money, and the associated transactions are usually not com-
plex. ' 165 Second, specific services expose MFIs to greater risk of terrorist
abuse. Remittances and money transfer services are more susceptible to
money laundering and terrorism financing. 166 Risk-based AML/CFT reg-
ulatory implementation is an option worthy of consideration. But incon-
sistent and differing regulatory regimes across borders will fragment the
global microfinance industry and inhibit the inclusion of billions of poor
people in the international financial system.
B. COMPREHENSIVE AML/CFT REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION
Each country and microfinance market possesses unique characteristics
requiring a particular set of regulations. But "[a]ppropriate standards are
not the same thing as low standards." 167 If the purpose and goal of
microfinance is to improve the lives of poor people by providing financial
services, which the developed world currently possesses, then MFIs
should think carefully before rejecting stringent AML/CFT regulations
suitable for most developed countries. Adopting diluted or phased-in
AML/CF[ regulations will isolate MFIs and slow the industry's commer-
cialization. If AML/CFT regulation is going to be effective it must be
implemented broadly and consistently across the globe. Thwarting the
subversive exploitation of financial systems requires an internationally
comprehensive approach.
Opponents argue that comprehensive FATF-standard AML/CFT regu-
lation would restrict and inhibit the emerging microfinance industry. 168
These critics suggest AML/CFT regulation is most likely to have two neg-
ative effects on microfinance. 169 First, the cost of regulatory compliance
161. Id.
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may jeopardize the viability of some MFIs.170 Due to the structure of the
microfinance industry, many MFIs are vulnerable to even the slightest
increase in operational costs. Increased costs may slow upscaling
microfinance entities or deter commercial banks from downscaling into
microfinance. Second, in developing countries where microfinance cli-
ents may not have physical addresses, national identity numbers, or other
identifying information, customer identification programs may be diffi-
cult to implement. 171 Subsequently, individuals will be precluded from
obtaining essential financial services.
Regulators, policymakers, and microfinance practitioners must strive
for a balance between over-regulating the industry and excluding present
or potential customers versus under-regulating the industry and possibly
leaving entire financial systems vulnerable to illicit exploitation. 72 Une-
ven application of AML/CFT regulation between formal financial sys-
tems and emerging microfinance systems will leave both systems
vulnerable to destabilization. MFIs should be required to operate within
similar constraints as the rest of the international financial system. As
MFIs integrate AML/CFT regulations, several factors may be of assis-
tance including: advancing technology, reallocation of donor funds, pub-
lic-private partnerships, and cross-border microfinance networks.
1. Advancing Technology
Innovative technological advancements may be a solution to this diffi-
cult intersection of microfinance and AML/CFT regulation. Automated
systems could assist in monitoring for suspicious transactions, while sim-
ple personal computing tools could enable easier implementation of so-
phisticated customer identification procedures. Several countries in Latin
America are already using "smart cards, fingerprint readers, and personal
digital assistants" to enhance their operational efficiency and expand into
more remote geographic areas. 173 Other "companies in southern Africa
are developing low-cost, cell phone-based banking services."'1 74 MFIs
should leverage the power of technology and the Internet to serve the
poor while complying with AML/CFT regulations.
2. Reallocating Donor Funds
As fewer international donor dollars are required for MFI operational
activity, these funds could be shifted to support and implement AML/
CFT regulations. Inevitably, the benefits of AML/CFT compliance in-
clude a more stable and secure financial system. Therefore, international
groups such as the United Nations, the IMF, the Bank, and USAID
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microfinance AML/CFT compliance effort. Actually, the U.N. has begun
to do this via its UNCDF Microfinance MicroStart program that "directs
capital to countries with young or emerging microfinance sectors. ' 175 For
example, Guatemala has received United Nations dollars that allowed
one microfinance entity to implement "digital fingerprinting technology
allowing illiterate clients to use a thumbprint for access to credit and sav-
ings."' 176 Reallocating donor funds will enable MFIs to acquire essential
technology, which will enhance AML/CFT compliance.
3. Public-Private Partnerships
Partnerships between commercial banks, NGOs, and intergovernmen-
tal organizations may be another solution. MFIs, previously organized as
NGOs, already possess the relationships and systems for identifying cus-
tomers and serving the unique needs of microfinance clients. These
NGOs and commercial banks could team up to leverage complementary
knowledge bases. Such operations are already occurring as demonstrated
by the partnership between FINCA, a large MFI, and VISA. FINCA
permits VISA to serve a broader clientele by simplifying VISA's task of
processing client applications and meeting applicable AML/CFT
regulations. 177
4. Cross-Border Microfinance Networks
Microfinance networks with operations in multiple countries must
comply with numerous AML/CFT regulatory regimes. To overcome this
difficult dilemma, these entities need practical steps for making sense out
of the complicated schemes of AML/CFT regulations. MFIs would be
well-advised to aspire to the highest AML/CFT standard commonly ac-
cepted by the international community. Turning to the IMF for insight
would also be wise. Modeling microfinance operations on a system that
would be compliant with all of the FATF provisions would be best. As
CGAP states, "Even where there is no national AML/CFT regime or
where national supervision capacity is weak, institutions should take the
initiative to establish measures based on internationally-accepted prac-
tices to protect themselves from being used for money laundering and the
financing of terrorism. 1' 78
Aspiring to higher standards than legally required may result in in-
creased operational costs. But for many MFIs, creating a streamlined set
of cross-border processes will lower costs. Developing nations with rudi-
175. United Nations Capital Development Fund, UNCDF Microfinance, http://64.233.
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mentary or nonexistent AML/CFT regimes would welcome MFIs within
their borders that implement higher standards. The IMF could serve as
an accrediting intermediary between MFIs and nations by affirming that
an entity's policies and procedures were in compliance with FATF
standards.
V. CONCLUSION
Terrorist financing and money laundering are a $1 trillion problem, but
even small, illicit amounts may result in big damage. Microfinance is a
rapidly growing industry that offers 3 billion of the world's poorest peo-
ple an opportunity to enter the formal financial system. Microfinance cli-
ents now have access to credit, savings, insurance, and remittance services
from a variety of providers including NGOs, specialized MFIs, and com-
mercial banks. Due to the increasing commercialization of microfinance,
numerous MFIs have become regulated institutions.
Several international organizations, including the United Nations, the
IMF, the Bank, and the FATF, are leading the way in applying AML/CFT
regulations to the microfinance industry. But policymakers and MFI op-
erators face a difficult challenge in determining the best approach for
microfinance AML/CFT regulation. Risk-based implementation poses
too great a risk to the stability of the international financial system. On
the other hand, comprehensive implementation will ensure that
microfinance clients receive the quality of financial services that they
deserve.
As AML/CFT regulations expand outward across the globe,
microfinance service providers will need to comply with these regula-
tions. Most importantly, while MFIs strive to comply with AML/CFT
regulations, they must not sacrifice their primary mission to provide poor
people with financial services. Implementing comprehensive regulations
will enhance the quality of microfinance services delivered to the poor.
Encouraging microfinance expansion without compromising on compre-
hensive AML/CFT regulatory implementation will protect the peace
while profiting the poor.
